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It is apparent that the Campbell case did not go so far as to conform with the English and American position with regard to the
standard of care owed by an occupier of premises, and it remains to
be seen in future decisions whether the courts will make express that
which the Campbell case implied, namely, that an invitee's knowledge
of the unusual danger will not necessarily discharge the invitor's duty
of care.

Ayoub et al. v. Bense & Beauprd, [1964] S.C.R. 448.
JOHN O'DONOGHUE*
TORT NEGLIGENCE
SUBSTANCES

-

STANDARD OF CARE IN USING VOLATILE

This was a case on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Ontario,
which had affirmed a judgment of Aylen, J., The facts are outlined in
the decision of Spence, J. in the Supreme Court of Canada thusly:
Bense, an employee acting in the course of his duty, while draining
the gasoline tank of an automobile preparatory to the removal of the

tank, bumped into a light cord. The extension cord fell and when the
light bulb (which was encased in the standard wire mesh protector)

struck the bottom of the pit, there was a mild explosion. Flames
enveloped the service station and caused damage to the adjacent
property. On these basic facts the Court of Appeal and Aylen, J. had
held that the defendants were not legally liable for the damage to the
adjacent property. Since the reasons for judgment of the lower courts

are not available, one must analyze the situation fully in order to assess
the Supreme Court decision, which reversed the lower courts.
Section 1 of the Accidental Fires Act 1 reads:
1. No action shall be brought against any person in whose house or

building or on whose land any fire accidentally begins, nor shall any
recompense be made by him for any damage suffered thereby; but no
contract or agreement made between landlord and tenant shall be hereby
defeated or made void.

In commenting on the Accidental Fires Act, Strong J. in The Canada
Southern Railway Co. v. Phelps2 said:

The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher would be applicable equally to fire, and
every person who built a fire in his house for ordinary domestic purposes
would but for the enactment be bound at his peril to keep it safely, and
liable to his neighbours for any damage which it might cause them,
though no negligence could be imputed. It was only to mitigate this rule
of law that the statute was passed, and it was not intended thereby to
alter the law of liability for negligende.3
*Mr. O'Donoghue is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 R.S.O. 1960 c. 3.
2 (1884), 14 S.C.R. 132.
3 Id. at 145.
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In view of the number of authorities which have interpreted the
statute in such a manner that its exempting provisions apply only to
fires accidentally begun and that one whose negligent conduct has
initiated the fire is not entitled to rely on the statute,4 one may assume
that the main point of difference between the courts in this case is
the standard of care that must be complied with before conduct is
labelled 'negligent'.
Numerous authorities have described the standard of care exacted
in the handling of volatile substances such as gasoline. In Read v.
Lyons,5 Lord MacMillan enunciated the following proposition:
I think that he succeeded in showing that in the case of dangerous things
and operations the law has recognized that a special responsibility exists
to take care. But I do not think that it has ever been laid down that
there is absolute liability apart from negligence where persons are
injured in consequence of the use of such things or the conduct of such
operations. In truth it is a mater of degree. Every activity in which man
engages is fraught with some possible element of danger to others. Experience shows that even from acts apparently innocuous injury to others
may result. The more dangerous the act the greater is the care that must
be taken in performing it. This relates itself to the principle in the modern
law of torts that liability exists only for consequences which a reasonable
man would have foreseen. One who engages in obviously dangerous operations must be taken to know that if6 he does not take special precautions

injury to others may very well result.

This proposition of Lord MacMillan has been accepted in Canadian
courts. 7 One may reasonably assume that the standard of care was
known to the lower courts in the present case. However the Supreme
Court of Canada stated that in the course of his conduct the defendant
Bense did not live up to that degree of diligence exacted of him. How
the court arrives at this conclusion is therefore the question, the
answer to which must be the principle to be derived from this case,
if it is to be employed as an authority in future cases.
It appears that what a court states with regard to the approach it
has taken in any given instance may differ greatly from what that
court actually does. In tort litigation, for example, the courts often
state that they will examine the facts and determine whether or
not the defendant has lived up to the requisite standard of care in his
conduct. However, the writer senses that the court, which is legitimately interested in arbitrating the dispute between the two parties
appearing before it, has generated a sympathy for one side or the
other during the presentation of the evidence. This sympathy is
generated as the facts emerge and the sympathy becomes a tendency
towards a solution. However, when it comes to the point where the
court must iterate a judgment there may well be a perplexity in the
mind of the judge: Would the financial burden of a decision weigh
4 Cf. Port Coquitlam v. Wilson [1923] S.C.R. 235; United Motor Services
v. Hutson [1937] S.C.R. 294; The Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Phelps
(1884), 14 S.C.R. 132; Filliter v. Phippard (1847), 11 Q.B. 347.
5 [1947] A.C. 156.
6 Id. at 172.

7 Cf. United Motor Services v. Hutson, supra, footnote 4; Dokuchia v.
Domansot [1945] O.R. 141, at p. 145.
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too heavily on the defendant? Would the burden on the defendant be
incommensurate with the loss that the plaintiff has suffered? Is there
any rule of law that precludes a finding for the plaintiff? Is there any
social policy in this case which should be considered before liability
is allocated? What are the ramifications of a decision for the plaintiff? These same considerations must also pass through the minds
of those on the bench adjudicating an appeal from the trial decision.
Surely the integrity of the legal institution would not be threatened
by open admission that the facts control the law, that other than
strictly legal principles are instrumental in the adjudication of cases.
Such an admission would obviate the need for the court to
strain to align the facts presented in evidence in such a way that
the facts may logically support the conclusion arrived at by the
court. One observes that a court will dwell at length on seemingly
inconsequential details attempting to distinguish authorities cited by
counsel which are virtually pari materia. In a close case such as the
present one, much ingenuity and imagination are often required. In
the judgment of Spence, J. in the Supreme Court of Canada, one notices
a compilation of acts of negligence:
1. To hang the lamp as insecurely as it must have been hung under the
circumstances was an act of negligence.
2. To lower the gas can to the floor of the pit and allow the drops to fall
some six feet from the bottom of the car to the funnel as it sat on the

top of the can or perhaps to the top of the can apart from the funnel,

was an act of negligence in view of the rapid vaporization of drops of
gas.
3. To so remove the funnel from the top of the gas can as it sat on the
floor of the pit as to permit the droplets which remained in the funnel
to fall upon the top of the can is an act of negligence.
4. Having permitted the drops to fall the six feet from the opening In the
gas tank to the top of the can, and also to fall from the funnel to the
can when the funnel was removed, and to fail to wipe off the can
immediately was an act of negligence.
5. Failure to move the lamp back from its insecure hanging place to a
safer position on the border of the pit before he attempted to move
around in the confined space carrying the heavy can was an act of
negligence.
6. Having failed to remove the lamp from its insecure hanging place, the
defendant was negligent in that he permitted himself to bump Into the
vulnerable hanging lamp and cause the lamp to fall, 8the cord pulling
the lamp so that it struck the top of the gas can.

If the Supreme Court had to manipulate the facts to this extent it
is understandable that the lower courts in this instance were unable
to label the conduct of the defendant mechanic as negligent. Spence,
J. recognizes this shortcoming in the analysis and adds:
It is true that the acts individually are of a very small degree, but that
combination of acts resulted in the damage accruing to the plaintiffs'
properties and resulted from the fact that the operation in which the
defendant Bense was engaged was one where any small piece of negli.
might have disastrous effects.9
8 [1964J S.C.R. 448, at 455.
9 Id. at 457.
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In this case the lower courts might logically have stated that
since the equipment was the proper type employed in the circumstances that it would not be negligent to use it in the usual manner.
Spence, J. however, rejects this notion and states that nothing particularly hinges on the type of equipment used but states that it was
the improper use of the equipment which resulted in the damage.
Distinctions such as this lead to the conclusion that many considerations extra-legal in their origin have a tremendous influence on
the interpretation of factual data in the formulation of an opinion.
Do the authorities support the opinion of the Supreme Court?
In United Motor Services v. Hutson,'0 the Supreme Court of Canada
held the defendant responsible on somewhat similar facts. The
defendant in that case was in possession of a building under lease
from the plaintiff who had erected it for use as an auto service garage
and for the sale of auto parts. While the defendant's employees (on
a hot day when the doors and windows were open) were cleaning
a cement floor of the building, using gasoline, scraping and scrubbing
with oakite heated in a tank on the ground floor by means of a
gas jet under the tank, and washing the floor off with water from a
hose, an explosion occurred and fire damaged the building. The exact
cause of the ignition was unknown. Expert witnesses for the plaintiff
testified that gasoline when vaporized was dangerous and that, given
the proper proportions of air and gas vapour, ignition might occur
or be caused by a naked flame, an electric spark or a hot body.
Witnesses for the defendant testified that in such cleaning it was
customary to use gas and scrapers and brushes and to wash the
floor off with water. The court found that the evidence fell short
of proving that it was the usual practice to clean such an area as that
in question under the conditions that existed that day. Some would
argue that the present case is an illogical extension of the principle
enunciated in United Motor Services v. Hutson while others would
assert that the decision was predictable as a natural outcome on the
facts in view of the current policy of the courts. The significance of
the case under review is, the writer suggests, that the Supreme Court
is politely informing the lower courts that defendants must be held
to a stricter than ever standard of care before they will be exonerated
from liabilty for damage that has been initiated by their conduct.
This attitude of 'plaintiff favouritism' has been exhibited in many
recent decisions of the Supreme Court.' 2
It would also seem from the minimal character of the negligence
found in this case that the Supreme Court is eviscerating the Accidental Fires Act 1 3 and is returning to the rule enunciated in Rylands
v. Fletcher.14 It would be difficult to conceive of a fire which better
accommodates the description "accidentally begins".
10 [1937] S.C.R. 294.

n Ibid.
12 For example, see Co-operators' Insurance Association v. Kearney 48
D.L.R. (2d) 1.
13 Supra, footnote 1.
14 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.

